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Abstract 
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral awards is currently ratified by 161 states. The Convention gives a visa for 
arbitral awards made in a Convention state and guarantees enforcement of the 
award elsewhere except on few grounds. It imposes obligations on states and their 
courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and arbitration agreements. 
It also imposes on courts the obligation to stay proceeding with a matter subject to 
the arbitration agreement. Ethiopia has not yet ratified the NYC. This article aims at 
demonstrating the challenges and prospects of ratification of the Convention by 
Ethiopia. I argue that by ratifying the Convention, Ethiopia would be able to, inter 
alia, increase trade and investment, get access to lower interest rates and rates of 
return, improve its international image, improve on competition for trade and 
investment, improve its arbitration system, decrease caseloads of courts and hasten 
its move towards the accession to WTO. These factors show that it is in the 
country's interest to ratify the Convention and domesticate it through the 
instrumentality of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
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Introduction 
With the growth of cross border transaction across all nations, international 
commercial arbitration is becoming very essential. Since investors and traders 
have their interests at stake, they will invest and/or transact depending on their 
degree of confidence to the availability of a dependable remedy if dispute arises. 
It is highly probable that the parties to the transaction would select arbitration 
for the settlement of their dispute for the latter‟s advantage over court litigation 
owing to the participation of disputants in the appointment of arbitrators or in 
the choice of arbitration organs.  
The benefits of arbitration cannot materialize in the absence of a mechanism 
by which parties can have the award enforced. The New York Convention 
(NYC) satisfies this need because it stretches a visa for an award to be enforced 
elsewhere where the award debtor has sufficient assets. The Convention 
imposes an obligation on member states and their courts to recognize and 
enforce arbitration awards and agreements. Article 5 of the Convention ensures 
enforcement by exhaustively listing the grounds for refusal of enforcement, and 
this makes it attractive to investors and business persons.   
The Ethiopian government has been working on legal reform to realize the 
objectives of the industrial development policy that encourages export 
manufacturing with a view to enhancing trade and investment. However, the 
measures so far taken are not adequate to fully achieve the policy objective for 
there is a need for further FDI inflow and a great number of the youth is 
unemployed. Furthermore, Ethiopian business persons are under increasing 
pressure to enter into contracts with suppliers in faraway regions and meet the 
vast and increasing local demands for goods and services. This is so because 
traders and investors are also concerned about their contract enforcement. 
Although Ethiopia was among the first signatories to the NYC, it has not yet 
ratified the Convention. The aim of this article is to analyze the pros and cons of 
ratification of NYC by Ethiopia. The first section presents an overview on the 
significance of primacy of international commercial arbitration. Section 2 
highlights the genesis and nature of the New York Convention followed by 
Sections 3 and 4 that examine the advantages and disadvantages of the 
ratification of the Convention by Ethiopia. The last section deals with the 
prospects of ratification, followed by conclusion. 
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1. The Significance of International Commercial Arbitration  
With the growth of international commercial transactions1, disputes become 
inevitable because of different commercial and legal expectations, cultural 
approaches, political complications and geographic situations.2 Differences can 
arise on the meaning of contract terms, the validity of the contract, and the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties. “Extraneous factors and human 
weaknesses, whether through mismanagement or over-expectation, will also 
interfere with contractual performance”.3 To settle all these disputes parties 
choose mechanisms which best fit their interest.  
The advent of fast cross border transaction has necessitated a less strict 
dispute resolution mechanism called the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)4. Arbitration which is at the center of ADR is “the most widely 
embraced process for business disputes, especially across national borders and 
boundaries”.5 This is because the process of court litigation has been 
“acknowledged to prove grossly inadequate and prone to more damage than the 
resolution of conflict by hampering positive future relations between the parties 
to it”.6 On the other hand, non-judicial mechanisms lack binding decisions and 
are susceptible to violation by the parties. That‟s why it becomes a fact of 
common knowledge that most business transactions are based on contracts that 
include binding arbitration clauses.  
The geopolitical, domestic, social, economic and other interests of nation-
states usually influence their trade and investment policies and outcomes.7 
“Governments may violate the rights of foreigners with less fear of political 
consequences than their own citizens, lobbyists, and contributors.”8 Parties thus 
prefer arbitration to litigation by local courts mainly because they consider 
                                           
1
Julian Lew et al (2014),  Comparative Commercial International Arbitration,  Kluwer Law 
International, Wolters Kluwer, pp 1-15.  
2
 Ibid  
3
 Ibid 
4
 Durosaro Wuraola (2014), „The Role of Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes‟, 
International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE), Volume 1, 
No 3, March 2014, p 2.  See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations, New York and Geneva 2005), p. 4. 
5
 Wuraola, Id., p. 4. 
6
 Ibid.  See also Meadow et al (2005), Dispute Resolution; Beyond the Adversarial Model, 
Aspen Publishers, New York, p. 451. 
7
 Avinash Dixit (2013), „International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Security‟, 
Department of Economics, Princeton University, Journal of Economic Laws, JEL Codes; 
F13, F21, F23, K33, P45, P48,  p. 2 
8
 Emilio Cardenas (1999), „Benefits of Membership‟, United Nations Publication Sales No. 
E99 V.2, p. 34. 
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arbitration as neutral and effective. As ambassador of Argentina, Emilio J. 
Cardenas noted; 
It is indeed difficult to be able to place one's trust blindly in local courts of 
law when the economic outcome of business transactions that have an 
international dimension is involved since there is a very real possibility of 
encountering local bias or partiality, which is not the exclusive preserve of 
any one region or system. It is a harsh reality which can sometimes appear in 
any area ..., regardless of the different social or cultural patterns in which it 
may manifest itself.9 
Likewise, Dixit states that traders and investors consider the security of their 
property and transaction at stake “when enforcement is in the hands of foreign 
governments and courts than they would be within their own countries.”10 The 
added insecurity when trading with, or investing in, another country creates a 
concomitant need for “added ex-ante precautionary actions to mitigate some of 
its effects, as well as attempts to devise new institutions for ex-post remedial or 
enforcement measures.”11 
In international commercial transactions, parties are cautious while selecting 
a dispute settlement mechanism and the venue of proceedings. This will result in 
“multiple filing, as the courts of a third country may decline the invitation to 
devote their resources to deciding a dispute that does not involve their 
interest.”12 
The second, and perhaps more significant difficulty is that judicial decisions 
are not very „portable‟ as awards in that it is difficult and sometimes impossible 
to enforce a court decision in a country other than the court of rendition.13 The 
ability to resolve disputes in a neutral forum and the enforceability of binding 
decisions, through the instrumentality of NYC, are therefore the major 
advantages of international commercial arbitration over the resolution of 
disputes in domestic courts.  
Generally, some of the common advantages of international arbitration are: 
- its „predictability‟ with respect to the place, governing law, procedural rules, 
scope, parties, language, … and its finality without appeal;  
- its being tailored to the needs of the contracting parties, including 
confidentiality and selection of decision makers, with special qualification 
and expertise, and  
                                           
9
 Id., p. 15. 
10
 Dixit, supra note 7, p. 3. 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Durosaro, supra note 4, p. 3. 
13
 Rajesh Babu (2006), „International Commercial Arbitration and the Developing 
Countries‟, AALCO Quarterly Bulletin 4,  p. 389.     
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- speed and cost-simplified procedures that are less likely to pursue rigid and 
highly rigid procedures.
14
 
2.  The Genesis and Nature of the New York Convention, 1958 
International commercial arbitration has been largely effective in settling 
international commercial disputes. Despite criticisms, there are arguments that 
its advantages outweigh its disadvantages. However, optimizing its benefits 
needs a mechanism by which the award creditor can get the award enforced at 
the place where the debtor has sufficient assets.  
During the first decades of the twentieth century, businesses and lawyers in 
developed states sought “reliable, effective, and fair legislation to facilitate the 
use of arbitration as a commercial dispute settlement and then expand 
international trade and investment.”15 In 1923, initially and later in 1927, under 
the auspices of the newly founded International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
major trading nations negotiated the Geneva protocol and Geneva Convention 
on arbitration clauses and execution of arbitral awards respectively.16 
Regrettably, the Geneva Treaties failed to fulfil the needs of the then business 
interests of developed countries and their citizens because the treaties placed the 
burden of proof in recognition proceedings on the award creditor and embodied 
the so-called double exequatur requirement.17 
These reasons necessitated further advancement in the area, and the ICC 
submitted the “Dutch Proposal” for discussion on 27 May 1958 which was 
welcomed by many of the Delegates.18 The main elements of this proposal were 
the elimination of the „double exequatur‟ and restricting the grounds for refusal 
of recognition and enforcement under Article 5 of the Convention i.e. the heart 
of the Convention.19 Therefore, the New York Convention on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards was adopted in 1958, by the UN 
General Assembly.  
                                           
14
 Ibid. See also Meadow et al, supra note 6, p. 450. 
15
 Won Kidane (2014), Dispute Resolution: an International Perspective, BDU law module, 
2014, pp 36, (unpublished);  See also Babu, supra note13, p. 391.  
16
 Ibid  
17
 The convention for the protocol focuses on arbitration agreements only, and it does not 
discuss enforcement of awards. See also Won Kidane, , supra note 15, p. 37. 
18
 It was believed logical to require an exequatur in the country where enforcement is sought 
and not in the country where award was rendered but enforcement was not sought. And it 
was also believed logical that the grounds for refusal should be exceptions raised by the 
award debtor. Pieter Sanders (1999), the History of the Convention, ICCA Congress 
Series No. 9 (Paris), Kluwer Law International, pp. 11-14. 
19
 See Ibid  
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According to Albert Jan Van den Berg, two basic actions are contemplated 
by the Convention; the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
and the referral by a court of a dispute subject to the arbitration agreement (stay 
of proceedings).20 The first action is that any NYC state is under an obligation to 
recognize and enforce foreign arbitral award21 subject to the limited grounds for 
refusal stipulated under Article 5. The second action contemplated by the 
Convention is the referral by a court to arbitration.22 Article 2(3) provides that 
“a court of a Contracting State, when seized of a matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an arbitration agreement, must, at the request of one of the 
parties, refer them to arbitration.” This is called a stay of proceeding. This is 
where the heart of arbitration ensures party autonomy. Accordingly, courts 
allow the parties to have their own private justice system as long as they have 
agreed to do so under their contract.  
These actions (i.e., the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards and the referral to arbitration by a court based on the arbitration 
agreement) require the fulfillment of the elements embodied in Article 2(1) and 
(2) which include in particular that the agreement be in writing and the matter 
should be arbitrable. The arbitrability of the subject matter requires that the 
arbitration agreement shall refer to a matter capable of being settled by 
arbitration.  
The agreement to arbitration could be arbitral clause to settle future disputes 
or an arbitral submission after the dispute arises. The validity or otherwise of the 
main contract does not affect the arbitration agreement. According to the 
separability or severability doctrine, the arbitration agreement and the main 
contract have an independent existence. This doctrine allows the arbitral 
determination of the validity of the underlying contract to go forward, and it also 
empowers the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction (Competence-
Competence).23 The arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on the existence or 
nonexistence, validity or invalidity of the arbitration agreement.24 With all these 
pro arbitration and pro enforcement features of the Convention, it has won 
appreciation from countries with regard to its role in facilitating and enhancing 
trade and investment development.  
                                           
20
 Won Kidane, supra note 15, p. 3. 
21
 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
1958, Art 1. 
22
 See Article 2 of the NYC. 
23
 Won Kidane (2012), China Africa Dispute Settlement; The Law, Economics and Culture 
of Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, pp 225-290. 
24
Allen Redfern and Martin Hunter (2009), On International Arbitration, 5th ed., Oxford 
University Press, Kluwer Law International, p. 69. 
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3. Advantages of Ratification of the Convention to Ethiopia 
Globalization has created economic interdependence among countries. To stay 
strong in this interconnectedness, however, difficult it may be, nations aspire to 
boost their economic activities by, inter alia, enhancing their international trade 
and investment25 which, inter alia, requires strengthening the legal system. 
Ethiopia‟s pursuits to implement the Agricultural Development Led 
Industrialization (ADLI) gave due attention to agriculture centred development 
and the Industrial Development strategy with special emphasis to export 
manufacturing.26 The Federal government is currently encouraging the 
establishment of manufacturing industries by establishing industrial 
development zones in various regions.27 The ambitious plans of the government 
as inferred from the first and second growth and transformation plans (GTPs), 
i.e. GTP I and GTP II, focus on Ethiopia‟s vision towards becoming lower-
middle income by 2025, and it aspires to achieve annual growth rate above 
11%.28  
During the preceding years, Ethiopia‟s economy was claimed to be one of the 
fastest economies in the world and particularly second in Africa.29 In effect, the 
country‟s export was increasing.30 Where there is trade, trade disputes are 
inevitable because there is a direct relationship between economic growth and 
commercial disputes.31 This will undoubtedly stimulate interest in commercial 
arbitration for dispute settlement.32 Since investors and traders have their own 
                                           
25
 Yohannes Woldegebriel (2015), Toward the Ratification of the New York Convention: 
Reasons and Justifications, AACCSA AI, p. 2 (unpublished). 
26
 The Agricultural Led Development Strategy of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
March, 2007 and Urban and Industrial Development Strategy of Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, March 2007. 
27
 Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012,  preamble. 
28
 The key policy goal during the first GTP period was to increase the share of export (both 
goods and non-factor services) in GDP to 22.5 percent by the end of the plan period. 
However, the share of export in GDP reached 12.4 percent by the end of 2013/14 which 
was far below the target.
28
 The ratio of export of goods and non-factor services to GDP is 
projected to increase to 20.6 percent in 2019/20 from 12.8 percent in 2014/15. Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), 
(2015/16-2019/20),  National Planning Commission, September, 2015, Addis Ababa 
29
 See, for example, Wondiferaw et al (2015), Ethiopia, African Economic Outlook, AfDB, 
OECD, UNDP, p. 1. 
30
 Id., p 2. 
31
 Albert Fiadjoe (2004),  Alternative Dispute Resolution; A Developing World Perspective, 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd, Wharton street, London, UK, pp 77-96. 
32
 See advantages of Arbitration in the discussion above. 
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economic interests at stake, they will invest and/or transact depending on their 
degree of confidence to the availability of a remedy in case dispute arises.33  
One of the most important reasons as to why parties to international 
commerce choose arbitration is the likelihood of obtaining enforcement by 
virtue of the New York Convention.34 The Convention gives parties (to an 
international commercial arbitration) the confidence that arbitral awards will be 
enforceable in a member country where the award debtor has sufficient assets. 
There are around 160 countries which are members of this Convention, in spite 
of their economic, political and geographical differences.35  
An award rendered in one of these states will be recognized and enforced in 
all member states, save certain exceptions stated under Article 5 of the 
Convention. The major trading partners of Ethiopia are members to the 
Convention.36 Although Ethiopia was among the first signatories, it has not yet 
become a member of the Convention. The delay and hesitation of Ethiopia in 
ratifying the 1958 Convention evokes interest to inquire into the challenges and 
prospects of ratifying the Convention.   
3.1. Increase Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Ethiopia encourages investment in the manufacturing sector so as to strengthen 
the domestic production capacity and thereby accelerate the economic 
development and improve the living standards of the people.37 The government, 
in particular, believes that increasing FDI is necessary to speed up the transfer of 
technology, the inflow of capital and employment opportunity to the country.38 
Currently, enhancing the role of the private sector in the country‟s economic 
development is given emphasis among the major goals of the government.39 
To achieve these objectives, the government should have investor-friendly 
laws since foreign investors make decisions to invest partly based on the legal or 
regulatory environment of a state.40 To promote FDI and reap its advantages, the 
                                           
33
 Asouzu Amazu (2001), International Commercial Arbitration and African States, 1
st
 ed., 
Cambridge University press, Cambridge, pp 27-50.  
34
 Moses, Margaret,  The Principles And Practices of International Commercial Arbitration, 
1
st
 ed., Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, pp 200-219. 
35
 Available @ newyorkconvention1958.org  
     Last accessed on March 21, 2016 on the list of contracting states.  
36
  See Worku Kassaw (2015), The Benefits of Adoption of CISG in Ethiopia, Bahir Dar 
University (Thesis), 2015, p.45 (unpublished). 
37
 See Preamble Ethiopian Investment Proclamation No 769/2012. 
38
 Id., see also Article 5(6) &7 of the Proclamation. 
39
 Ibid, Article 5(6) of the Proclamation. See also Privatization of Public Enterprises 
Proclamation, 1998, Federal Negarit Gazette, 5
th
 year, No 26.  
40
 Since Ethiopia has reformed its national policy framework to an investor-friendly 
environment and is endowed with fertile land, it has attracted FDI from different 
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government provides investment incentives and guarantees through its 
investment laws.41 Ethiopia needs further inflow of capital through incoming 
foreign investment and a great deal of the youth is unemployed.42 This is 
attributable to various factors which, inter alia, include the level of Ethiopia‟s 
attractiveness for foreign direct investment.   
Investment decisions are dependent upon preconditions such as the ability of 
investors to enforce contracts to protect their investments.43 Ratification can thus 
contribute to the encouragement of FDI inflow to Ethiopia because investors are 
highly concerned with their contract enforcement, in addition to which  various 
measures that can promote investment are not yet enough. Ratification of the 
NYC would send a signal to foreign investors that Ethiopia is committed to 
protecting the interests of investors with due fairness. As respondent 
(practitioner and expert) said; “investors are suspicious of the internal political 
and legal system of a country because of lack of knowledge of the system or 
lack of independence of it from political influence, including arbitration laws”44  
Investors will be unwilling to invest in Ethiopia or they will do it at a greater 
cost for Ethiopia than they do it in any other member state. This is because the 
NYC ensures “efficient, predictable and uniform enforcement of awards 
elsewhere.”45 It is efficient in the sense that arbitral awards are enforceable at 
the place where relevant assets of the award debtor are located save the few 
exceptions listed under Article 5 of the Convention.  
                                                                                                            
countries. See Joseph Lowther (2007), Analysis of the Effect of Tajikistan’s Future 
Ratification of the New York Convention, USAID Report, July 2007, p, 4. See also,  
UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2008, p 16 
41
 Articles 23 and 25 of the Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, entitle investors 
remittances out of Ethiopia in convertible foreign currency: profits and dividends accruing 
from investment; principal and interest payment on external loans; payments related to a 
technology transfer agreement; proceeds from the sale or liquidation of an enterprise; 
proceeds from the transfer of shares or of partial ownership of an enterprise to a domestic 
investor; expatriate employees may remit, in convertible foreign currency, unspent 
salaries and other payments accruing from their employment in hard currency. 
42
 See Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP I), 2014, Annual Report, p. 7. 
43
 Demekas Dimitri et al (2005), Foreign Direct Investment in South Eastern Europe: How 
(and How Much) Can Policies Help?, International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper/05/110, June, 2005, pp. 1-32 at p 5;  see also UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 
supra note 40, p. 16. 
44
 Interview with Professor Tilahun Teshome,  April 6, 2016 (author‟s translation).  
45
 Allen Hamilton (2005),  Reinforcing Ethiopia’s International Trade Law Framework for 
Stronger Business Environment; A case for the ratification of the New York Convention 
and CISG, USAID WTO Plus Project, Task Order No. 6 Ethiopia WTO Accession Plus, 
2009 at pp. 7. 
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Uniformity relieves investors from “becoming specialists in the domestic 
arbitrations laws of each country with which they plan to invest.”46 This, in turn, 
avoids transaction cost. The lack of knowledge in the internal legal and/or 
political system of Ethiopia will not hinder investors from investing in the 
country for two reasons. Firstly, arbitration is a private system of justice which 
is tailored to the needs of the parties to the agreement including the applicable 
law. And secondly, NYC overrides the internal legal system except in the cases 
where the Convention refers to the internal legal system of Ethiopia.  
There are, however, disagreements with some persons who assert that 
becoming a member to the Convention does not have any nexus with FDI, and it 
does not contribute to its enhancement. For example a key informant in an 
interview believes “that ratification of the Convention does not have any direct 
relationship with FDI on two grounds. First, the Convention is applicable to 
commercial transactions and foreign awards only; and second, there is still high 
flow of investment to Ethiopia.47 [Translation mine] 
This author disagrees with this argument. The first gap in the argument 
relates to the unduly narrow definition of „commercial transactions‟.  The word 
„commercial‟ under Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Model law is meant to 
implement the Convention broadly which includes investment.48 Although any 
member state may put the Commercial reservation clause when it ratifies 
accedes to or signs the Convetion, it can, according to Article 1(3) of the 
Convention define the term „commercial‟ according to its own law, the 
international practice seems to interpret it broadly.49   
Second, it is to be noted that an award considered as non-domestic in the 
enforcement state can be recognized and enforced there. According to Berg, a 
non-domestic award can include, “an award made in the enforcement State 
under the arbitration law of another State; and an award made in the 
enforcement State under the arbitration law of that State involving a foreign (or 
international) element”.50 Therefore, an investor even with permanent 
establishment here, in Ethiopia may get its award enforced wherever the arbitral 
seat might have been, including Ethiopia.  
                                           
46
 Ibid 
47
  Interview with an expert in the AACCSA AI (anonymous), expert in the Institute, April 
3, 2016 (author‟s translation). 
48
 See the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 1.  See 
also, Albert Berg (2003), The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: An Overview, 
Journal of Year Book, Volume 28, No 7, 2003,  p. 2.  
49
 UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 2012, under the scope of application on the definition of „Commercial’, p. 1 
50
 Berg, supra note 48, p. 3. 
 Towards a Better Commercial Arbitration: Should Ethiopia Ratify the NY Convention?         133 
 
 
Third, the investor whose award was rendered in Ethiopia will be able to get 
the enforcement of the award in another NYC state because the Convention 
imposes an obligation on member states to recognize and enforce arbitration 
agreements and awards.51 Therefore, the fact that awards rendered in Ethiopia 
will be enforced elsewhere will enhance the confidence of investors. And the 
fourth, perhaps the most important reason is that becoming a member of the 
Convention sends a signal to a foreigner that the country is committed to 
enforcing contracts. This means that the country will build an international 
image.52  
Finally, the mere fact that there is a high flow of investment to the country 
does not disprove the significance of the 1958 New York the Convention in the 
attraction of FDI.  Notwithstanding the importance of other measures that can be 
taken by the government, they can have greater effect if they are accompanied 
by the ratification of the NYC. Moreover, we are not sure of the opportunity 
cost of failing to ratify the Convention, i.e., the different guarantees and 
incentives that are provided by the government might have been replaced by 
ratifying the Convention, and we “we have to see the unseen.”53 
FDI can enhance the export supply capacity of the country, because it is an 
important factor which positively affects export.54 As Yishak Tekalign states;  
There is a consensus among development economists that FDI inflows are 
likely to play an important role in explaining the growth of recipient 
countries. By increasing capital stock, FDI can contribute to a more efficient 
use of existing resources and absorb unemployed resources and thus increase 
a country‟s output and productivity.55  
3.2. Enhancing trade (export and import) 
Ethiopia‟s foreign trade has greatly expanded over the past decades and will 
remain so thus creating greater interdependence with the world economy.56 
Ethiopian business persons are under increasing pressure to enter into contracts 
with suppliers in distant regions and meet “the vast and increasing local 
demands for goods and services and desperately growing need to raise as much 
                                           
51
 This applies to would be enforcing states that do not put reciprocity reservation. See 
Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Convention. 
52
 See the detailed discussion made below. 
53
 Interview with Tecle Hagos,  Associate professor,  Mekelle University, April 28, 2016  
54
 Yishak Tekaligne (2009, Determinants of Ethiopia's Export Performance: A Gravity 
Model Analysis, Trade and Development Discussion Paper No 1/2009,Tbkp 
Development Research & Consulting, Munich, June 2009, p. 4.ade 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Yohannes Woldegeriel, supra  note 25, p. 2.  
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foreign currency as possible to help the development of the country.”57 
Moreover, currently, Ethiopian government has recognized the private sector as 
the engine of economic development in its industrial development 
policy/strategy and has been promoting privatization.58  It is obvious that with 
privatizing more public enterprises, increasing number of commercial disputes 
will be submitted to arbitration. In this regard, the ratification of NYC becomes 
necessary because the Convention gives a visa for awards to be enforceable 
elsewhere.  
Until NYC‟s ratification, Ethiopia‟s business firms will be “at a competitive 
disadvantage when they do business on an international scale for they will be 
vulnerable if they are unable to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of 
arbitration agreements in the case of transactions having an international 
dimension.”59 This is because a foreign trader which has a stake in its business 
will hardly choose Ethiopian trader; or if it does so, it would be on much higher 
cost as compared to its contractual relations with a trading partner from a 
contracting state. Ethiopia is, therefore, required to play a proactive role in 
providing its private sector with the necessary instrumental framework to enable 
it to compete with its foreign counterparts.60 
Ratification of the Convention leads to an increase in Ethiopia‟s exports of 
locally manufactured goods. In countries that have ratified the NYC, the quality 
of domestic institutions is somewhat less important for complex goods exports 
than for countries that have not yet signed the Convention.61 This is because 
ratification of the Convention shows the country‟s willingness to enforce 
contracts impartially. This changes trade partners‟ perception of a country and 
its level of risk. Indonesia, for example, witnessed over 43% increase of export 
of complex goods in 9 years; the share of manufactured exports (i.e. complex 
goods) increased from only seven percent of total exports in 1983 to over fifty 
percent by 1992 because of legal reform measures including the ratification of 
the NYC.62  
                                           
57
 Ibid. 
58
 To implement this policy the government has enacted laws on privatization of public 
enterprises and establishment of the supervising authority. See the Industrial Development 
strategy, p. 1. See also Proclamation No. 146/1998 and Proclamation No. 412/2004 for 
privatization of public enterprises and establishment of privatization and public enterprise 
supervising authority respectively. 
59
 Cardenas, Benefits of Membership, supra  note 8, p. 16. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Daniel Berkowitz et al (2004), „Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows‟, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 26:000, August 2004, p. 14. 
62
 Id., p. 20. 
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The ratification of the Convention in LDC countries like Ethiopia, as Amazu 
stated, is an „option of necessity‟ for foreign traders do not trust the internal 
legal system.63 As Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative noted: 
Companies that operate businesses in Ethiopia assert that its judicial system 
remains inadequately staffed and inexperienced, particularly with respect to 
commercial disputes. While property and contractual rights are recognized, 
and [even though] there are commercial and bankruptcy laws, judges often 
lack understanding of commercial matters and the scheduling of cases often 
suffers from extended delays. Contract enforcement remains weak.64 
In such settings, foreign parties to commercial contracts rely on arbitration 
and its subsequent enforcement. Inability to use such an opportunity will result 
in trade diversion towards other Convention states or the transaction will be 
made at a higher cost to Ethiopian traders.  
3.3. Lower credit interest rates and better rates of return 
Since investors and traders have their economic interest at stake, they will invest 
or transact based on their degree of confidence in case disputes arise.65 “The 
interest rates demanded by lenders and rates of return demanded by investors are 
directly correlated to the level of real and perceived risk in a country.”66 
Investors, lenders and export credit insurers are likely to regard non-payment 
risk as lower in a country that has ratified the NYC.67 These risks are more 
complicated when they involve African countries, including Ethiopia, in which 
states as economic agents want to sustain a supervisory role in their economic 
performances.68 
According to Anderson and Van Wincoop, as cited by Aljaz Kuncic, trade 
costs/aggregate transaction costs arise from institutional factors such as law 
enforcement (contract enforcement costs and legal and regulatory costs), 
property rights and informal institutions.69 These costs are taken into account in 
economic analysis in a systematic way as „rules of the game‟ with any kind of 
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externalities always present in the market.70 As Coase stated, “... institutional 
setting within which the trading takes place affects the incentives to produce and 
the costs of transacting.”71 
Therefore, moral hazard considerations in the international credit market 
under sovereign risk and differences between countries in the domestic 
institutions/laws of credit contract enforcement under incomplete information 
may lead to a higher interest rate or rationed credit.72 In such situations, the non-
ratifying state and its businesses may face a comparative disadvantage because 
the possibility of non-enforcement of contracts maximizes distortions and 
erodes competitiveness.73 Ratifying the Convention has a measurable impact on 
a country‟s trading patterns and it affects the perception of a country‟s 
institutional quality independent of tangible legal reforms.74 
In Ethiopia, many of the commercial transactions are made by public 
enterprises which stir up fear (for foreign traders and investors) that the 
involvement of government interest may complicate the matter.75 These 
perceived and real risks may then have a negative effect on the interest rates and 
rates of return. This might have been the reason why challenges in timely 
securing of foreign finances in addition to underperformance of exports were 
identified as challenges to the smooth implementation of development projects 
in GTP I.76 Therefore, Ethiopia‟s membership to the Convention can enhance 
the opportunity of the business sector in Ethiopia to easily get loans at lower 
interest rates and more beneficial rates of return from foreign investors, lenders 
and export credit insurers. This, in turn, will have a positive influence on 
financing development projects thereby enhancing the development of the 
country as a whole.  
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3.4. Improve international reputation 
Ratification of the Convention shows that a country is open to participation in 
the global economy. This is particularly important in developing countries like 
Ethiopia with low levels of reputation for courts.77 Statements that a state is 
business friendly and open to doing business with foreign companies are much 
less effective than concrete actions such as ratifying an international 
convention.78 
Ratifying an international treaty is a more sincere signal than unilateral 
declaration because deviations will be noticed not only as “domestic aberrations 
but as violations of the international legal order as well.”79 Hence, investors and 
traders will be more persuaded by the fact that a state is a member of an 
international convention than its statements and internal legal system which 
might be perceived as biased or problematic. Therefore, failing to ratify the 
Convention, as one key informant expressed, “taints the image of Ethiopia as 
many very essential international forums are conducted, here, in the country.”80  
3.5. Improve arbitration system  
Ethiopian judicial system is criticized for being poorly staffed particularly with 
respect to commercial disputes.81 Furthermore, parties to cross-border 
transactions lack confidence on the arbitration system of the country.82 These 
negative attitudes towards the country‟s commercial law system have been 
affecting its trade and investment. Ratifying the Convention will contribute to 
the development of Ethiopia‟s legal and institutional capacity since the 
Convention is appreciated for its contribution to the development of 
international commercial law. “Accession to the Convention can boost local 
arbitration capacity and often spurs and is part of domestic legal reform in the 
area of arbitration.” 83  
Ratification will expose courts and arbitration institutions to the provisions of 
the Convention and of course to its domestic version, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law‟s provisions. This can contribute to the development of the domestic 
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arbitration system. Ethiopia will be required to enact legislation because the 
Convention is not self executing (unlike the Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods). In countries where there is outdated arbitration system/law, 
setting the provisions of the Convention and the Model Law in an independent 
legislation is advisable and it minimizes interpretation problems during 
recognition or enforcement. This is because courts will more likely refer to 
international rules of interpretation for international treaties if they have to 
directly interpret the Convention. Secondly, training (which is mandatory) to 
judges or arbitrators on the nature and applicability of the Convention will 
enhance the knowledge of these parties who will finally influence government 
for domestic legal reform.  
Thirdly, domestic arbitration system will benefit from experience sharing 
because a multitude of cases can be arbitrated in Ethiopia once the country 
becomes a member. This may happen in two ways. First, Ethiopia can be 
chosen as an arbitral seat by disputing parties and the award rendered will be 
recognized and/or enforced elsewhere. Second, awards made in another country 
can seek recognition and enforcement in Ethiopia thereby exposing Ethiopian 
courts to decisions rendered in other countries. These parties to the arbitration 
(especially if they are big companies) and arbitrators may compel or encourage 
countries to conduct legal reform so as to protect their property rights.84 
Ratifying the Convention enhances institutionalization. This is because the 
Convention‟s provisions are discussed in numerous articles by prominent 
professors in the area.85 This coupled by the UNCITRAL Model Law (the 
domestic version of NYC) indeed enhances knowledge of international and 
national arbitration law. As a key informant noted: 
Ratifying the Convention will strengthen the Ethiopian arbitration system: 
ratification makes the domestic arbitration to have a better exposure towards 
modern arbitration system. Many arbitration disputes involving international 
and national traders will be settled in Ethiopia.86  
He further relates ratification of the Convention with its positive contribution 
toward the development of the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce & Sectoral 
Associations Arbitration Institute (AACCSA Al) by stating that “ratifying the 
Convention can pave the way for AACCSA AI to be a regional centre of 
arbitration.”87 According to Redfern, “[a]rbitration centres represent a potential 
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source of revenue or (perhaps of prestige) to the host country.”88 That‟s why 
national governments sought to gain economic advantage by promoting local 
arbitration backed by the establishment of centres for dispute resolution.89  
As Bronwen Kausch pointed out AACCSA AI can play a role in increasing 
networking to bring companies together and settle disputes.90 By creating 
contact between big businesses looking for small businesses to trade with, the 
institute can play an important role in harmonizing the experiences of all 
members so that efficiency will be achieved. The institute can also play a role 
through training in building the capacity of arbitrators, judges and practitioners.91 
Increasing the number of skilled professionals with knowledge of international 
arbitration will in turn help to promote Ethiopia's ratification of the NYC.92 
Moreover, the fact that Addis Ababa is the seat of the African Union and many 
other international organizations can make the AACCSA AI a regional centre 
for dispute settlement.  
It is believed that “developing the arbitration environment can improve the 
economic growth in Africa”.93 This is because commerce needs trust which in 
turn needs firm pillars of law to rest on. This would pave the way for the 
certainty of enforcement of commercial contracts.94  
3.6. Increase capacity for investment and trade competition 
When foreign investors are considering large investment or trade deal, they 
often consider more than one country. To the extent that these investors consider 
dispute resolution as a factor in their investment and trade decisions, a non-
ratifying state will be at a disadvantage.95 According to an interviewee, there are 
various factors for parties to choose Ethiopia as a seat for arbitration, and there 
is the need to “to take advantage” of this.96 However, without ratification of the 
Convention Ethiopia will be at a disadvantage unlike its neighbouring member 
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states, as long as investors and traders consider dispute resolution as a factor.97 
The late Prime Minister of Ethiopia had said:  
We do not think foreign companies are angels. They seek profit and there is 
nothing wrong with that. I don't think Ethiopia is an island and we won't 
survive as an island ....but we can't expect foreigners to do everything for us. 
We have to make sure it is a win-win solution.98  
Currently, many African states –especially Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) member states– have ratified the Convention 
considering their obligation under the treaty. Ethiopia ought to, as a COMESA 
member state, review its position towards the ratification of the Convention.99 
By becoming a member to the Convention, Ethiopia can increase competition 
for trade and investment.   
3.7. Decrease Court Congestion  
Arbitration will take some cases from the already “full state court dockets.”100 
This frees the state courts to more quickly resolve other cases. This particularly 
will help Ethiopian courts since they are greatly congested with cases. A key 
informant stated the significance of arbitration in the context of the challenge in 
Ethiopian courts. 101 
Arbitration also helps to prevent lengthy disputes about the proper forum for 
resolving an international commercial dispute and the enforcement of any 
resulting judgment.102 Moreover, the fact that most of the arbitral awards are 
voluntarily complied with by the parties decreases case loads in Ethiopian 
courts. For instance, over 90% of the International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Court (ICCAC) awards are complied with and do not need to go to 
state courts for enforcement.103 This contributes to the efficient and speedy 
settlement of disputes. 
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3.8. Advantages in Relation to WTO Accession 
Ethiopia is on the move to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
“Effective integration into the multilateral trading system requires more than 
simply earning of mere membership to the WTO.”104 Ethiopia„s intention to be 
an active player in the global economy as evidenced through its pursuits to 
accede to the WTO needs comprehensive reform measures: including 
strengthening the commercial law framework.105 The adoption of the NYC is a 
step forward to protect local business persons, enhance the confidence and trust 
of the foreign business partners, and promote the importance and use of 
arbitration institutions in providing their services at an international level.106 
Ratification of the Convention and commitment to honour its provisions 
strengthens Ethiopia‟s likelihood of accession to the WTO.107   
4. Challenges of Ratification to the Country 
Some of the criticisms against Ethiopia‟s immediate ratification of the NYC 
emanate from the nature and purpose of the Convention and its effect to states 
and their business persons. There are also criticisms relating to the uncertain 
benefits of arbitration. We can classify the problems of the Convention into 
three broad categories; problems relating to (i) the Convention, (ii) the country 
that intends to ratify it, and (iii) the uncertain benefits of arbitration. 
4.1. Inherent problems of the convention 
The disadvantages that are often raised in relation with the Convention are 
erosion of sovereignty, advantages to foreign firms, lack of uniform 
interpretation of the Convention, inability of domestic firms to avoid debts, and 
time and expense required to implement legislation.108 
4.1.1 Erosion of Sovereignty 
The Convention takes away the Government of Ethiopia‟s ability to resolve 
disputes with foreign investors or traders or to interfere in projects or 
transactions after contracts (containing arbitration clauses) are signed.109 It also 
takes away some powers of the courts such as the power to interfere in the 
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validity of arbitration agreement, arbitral proceedings and/or recognition and 
enforcement of awards. Although they are still able to review arbitration awards 
prior to issuing a writ of execution upon the initiation of the award debtor or on 
their own initiation, such flexibility of courts is to a larger extent limited such as 
the circumstances stated under Article 5 of the Convention.  
For example, the writing requirement under Article 2 of the Convention 
includes the exchange of letters or telegrams, and is inconsistent with Ethiopian 
law which requires certain forms of contracts to be attested by two witnesses.110 
An arbitration agreement to submit a dispute arising from the contract of 
insurance or guarantee shall be made in writing and be attested by two 
witnesses111 which are stricter than the requirements under Article 2 of the 
Convention. With respect to refusal of recognition and enforcement, while the 
Convention limits itself to Article 5 (mainly due to procedural irregularity, the 
conduct of arbitrators, the problem on the arbitration agreement etc to be raised 
by the award debtor), the Article 461of the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code 
recognizes enforcement as an exception than a rule.112 These requirements may 
have their own policy reasons which Ethiopia will subordinate to the 
Convention. Moreover, the power of the courts to review on the merits of 
arbitral decisions will no longer exist in Ethiopia as far as foreign awards are 
concerned. 
This challenge is, however, common to all international treaties which states 
forgo for a better interest common to all. Since the Convention is concerned 
only with procedures of arbitration agreements and awards, it submits itself to 
national substantive legislation; and no serious harm may be caused to 
Ethiopia‟s interest.  
4.1.2 Advantages to foreign firms 
Another problem of the Convention is that upon ratification, foreign firms 
would have the ability to resolve disputes with Ethiopian firms in foreign 
arbitration tribunals, while Ethiopian firms with purely domestic disputes would 
not, and would be forced to use the Ethiopian courts/arbitration centres. 
Moreover, since the Convention is applicable to foreign awards or non-domestic 
awards, recognition and enforcement of awards which are purely domestic will 
rely on the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code which may be detrimental to the 
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award creditor. This is because awards are subject to review on their merits113, 
unlike foreign awards which are presumptively enforceable under the 
Convention subject to, however, Article 5 of the Convention. Moreover, if the 
decision of the arbitrators is problematic and in case the Ethiopian award debtor 
fails to apply for annulment in the relevant foreign arbitral seat, this will create a 
problem for Ethiopia to the advantage of foreign firms.  
Such problems may be, however, common occurrences to courts‟ decisions 
too and are not unique to arbitral decisions. In fact, commercial arbitration is 
chosen by parties for its advantages such as expertise and effectiveness even far 
better than courts. Furthermore, failing to ratify the Convention may be against 
the interest of Ethiopian firms with awards made in Ethiopia while foreign firms 
with awards made in a Convention state may settle their claims against the 
assets of the former in another Convention state.  Moreover, the likelihood of 
enforcing arbitral awards to the disadvantage of Ethiopian firms who settled 
their dispute abroad is not as worse as court decisions. Domestic firms with 
domestic claims can rather benefit from ratification because the Convention 
improves domestic alternative dispute resolution (ADR) opportunities.  
4.1.3 Inability of domestic firms to escape enforcement through merit 
review 
If Ethiopia becomes a member of the NYC, some Ethiopian-based companies 
with most of their assets in Ethiopia would not be able to avoid payment in 
international disputes, since arbitration awards obtained in international 
arbitration courts could be enforced in Ethiopian courts.114 In other words, 
Ethiopian companies cannot utilize state courts to delay or avoid payment of a 
debt to foreign companies. Although this might not be a plausible argument, this 
will be against Ethiopia and its firms where there is a problem in the decision of 
the arbitrators. This is because the NYC does not allow merit review of 
arbitration awards in the enforcement state; and the Ethiopian award debtor 
might not have the award annulled in the arbitral seat. 
To escape from enforcement of foreign awards especially from Eritrean 
government‟s claims has been the reason, as some say, that Ethiopia remains 
reluctant to ratify the Convention.115 This fear, however, is unfounded for 
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different reasons.116 Firstly, mere accession to this instrument would not be the 
same as forfeiting the immunity a state is internationally endowed.117 Secondly, 
when acceding to the Convention, Ethiopia may on the basis of reciprocity 
(Article 1/3 of the NYC) declare that it will apply the Convention to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another 
Party to the Convention. Thirdly, it may also declare that it will apply the 
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law 
of Ethiopia. Fourthly, it may declare that it will apply the Convention only to 
those arbitral awards which were adopted after the entry into effect of the 
Convention.118 
The desire to protect Ethiopian firms from the enforcement of awards against 
them is not good enough reason for not being a party to the Convention. First, 
since arbitration is a result of the parties‟ agreement, an award cannot be 
enforced against a party that did not give his consent to resort to arbitration in 
the first place. When an agreement has been willingly entered into, it is only 
natural that the parties should and would honour the terms of their agreement.119 
Second, whereas foreign parties (from NYC states) can often enforce arbitration 
awards made in their own country against the assets of Ethiopian parties held in 
any other NYC state, an Ethiopian party that obtains an award in Ethiopia might 
find it difficult to enforce that award against the foreign party„s assets located in 
many NYC states since Ethiopia did not ratify the Convention.120 
4.1.4  Time needed to develop and implement legislation and lack of 
uniformity 
The New York Convention sets minimum requirements for enforcement of 
awards and agreements which may be contrary to the existing Ethiopian laws. In 
such situations, enactment of legislation may be required. This involves time 
and the adoption of the Convention will require judicial training on enforcement 
of foreign arbitration awards. This cannot be impediment to the ratification of 
the NYC because “…..capacity building is a process.”121  
An important aim of the Convention was uniformity, and the fulfilment of 
that aim is dependent upon the willingness of national legislatures and courts in 
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different contracting states to adopt uniform interpretations of the 
Convention.122 There are national courts that challenge the uniform 
interpretations of the Convention.123 Therefore, the statement that the 
Convention promotes uniformity in interpretation and application and avoids 
uncertainties, as some say124 is unwarranted. These uncertainties can create 
transaction costs and are detrimental to trade and investment. In fact if 
uniformity in interpretation is not ensured, ratification of the Convention 
becomes superfluous.  Contrary to the arguments against uniform interpretation 
of the NYC, the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law is meant to implement 
the Convention by many states, thereby contributing to the uniform application 
and interpretation of the Convention by national legislators and courts.125  
4.2. Country Specific Problems 
4.2.1 Legal Problems 
To date, the Convention is praised for its pro arbitration nature by limiting the 
arbitrary flexibility of domestic countries to impose their own requirements 
thereby guarding their particular political and economic interests. However, the 
diverse application of the Convention has made it weak to overcome, as Robert 
Briner said, “the obvious lack of an efficient universal enforcement 
procedure.”126 There is no central jurisdiction for the enforcement of the 
Convention awards, the main reason being state sovereignty, as suggested by 
several authors.127 In other words the Convention does not fully attain the 
purpose it meant to achieve; and as Pieter Sanders stated, “the Convention was 
drafted in an imperfect world” to show that state sovereignty is a major barrier 
to the development of the Convention.128 Because of domestic legal and 
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institutional differences, which in turn result in legal uncertainties, states do not 
give to the Convention a life that it deserves.129  
The Convention requires any member state to recognize and enforce 
arbitration agreements with arbitrable subject matter.130 But arbitrability differs 
from state to state according to its own political, social, and economic policy.131 
In Ethiopia, administrative contracts are not arbitrable according to Article 
315(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, an award rendered in a foreign 
country may be refused in Ethiopia if the dispute which led to the award falls 
under Article 315(2). However, the current practice of submitting administrative 
contracts to arbitration coupled with the cassation decision on the issue can 
mitigate this challenge.132  
Moreover, the Convention imposes an obligation on state parties that their 
courts should recognize and enforce arbitration agreements made in written 
form as binding.133 The writing requirement includes telegrams and exchange of 
letters. The Convention further obliges state courts to recognize and enforce 
arbitration agreements unless the agreements are null or void, in operative or 
incapable of being performed.134 Nullity or invalidity of arbitration agreements 
will be decided depending on national laws of each member country. 
Therefore, any arbitration agreement made based on exchange of letters or 
telegrams will be null according to Ethiopian laws. This is because, for example, 
contracts with administrative bodies or insurance contracts shall be made in 
written form and be attested by two witnesses.135 Therefore, an arbitration 
agreement which is valid according to the NYC may be invalid under Ethiopian 
laws. As the Convention‟s requirements are considered as minimum 
requirements in the international commercial arbitration,136 the strict formal 
requirements under the Ethiopian Civil Code can be a challenge. Moreover, 
these formal requirements in Ethiopia can be considered as parts of public 
policy of the country, thereby creating difficulties in the enforcement of awards.  
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There is also a mismatch between Article 461 of the CPC and Article 5 of the 
Convention. Unlike the Convention and the Model Law, the Ethiopian law on 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards starts with a negative statement.137 The 
phrase in Art 461 of the CPC which provides that “foreign arbitral awards may 
not be enforced in Ethiopia unless...” sounds anti-enforcement in the sense that 
it makes enforcement conditional on the fulfillment of all the conditions laid 
down in the law.138 In other words, foreign awards are not enforceable as a rule 
but exceptionally when proof to that effect is achieved by the award creditor. 
This statement and the procedures of Article 459 of the CPC139 may create 
rooms for the award debtor to escape enforcement.140 This problem, however, 
can be mitigated by the application of Article 456(1) of CPC which gives due 
attention to international conventions.141 
4.2.2 Practical Problems 
Some judges and practitioners in national courts may be unfamiliar with the 
details of the Convention or they may be divided on its practical utility or extent 
of applicability in the domestic sphere.142 This can be particularly severe in the 
Africa, including Ethiopia.143 This is a real problem in Ethiopia for its 
courts/judges and practitioners are criticized.144 According to Ambassador 
Michael, as stated above in this chapter, “Ethiopia's judicial system is poorly 
staffed …, particularly with respect to commercial disputes.”145   
The problems relating to perceptions of arbitration in Ethiopia can, according 
to a key informant, be attributed to unfavorable treatment “particularly in the 
arbitration of international business transactions.”146 Another challenge in 
Ethiopia‟s ratification is the lack of institutional (basically judicial) capacity to 
recognize and enforce awards. With the ratification of the Convention by 
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Ethiopia, it is obvious that the number of arbitration cases will increase and 
many foreign award creditors will submit recognition and enforcement requests 
to Ethiopian courts. This coupled with the tradition of Ethiopian courts in 
delaying cases will pose serious problems. “But this problem is temporary for 
capacity building is a process and cannot be attained immediately.147 This 
problem can further be mitigated by the fact that many arbitral awards are 
voluntarily complied.148  
4.3. Problems in relation to the uncertain benefits of arbitration 
Currently there are criticisms against international arbitration. There is the 
criticism that commercial arbitration was configured to favour the economic 
interest of the developed world and the applicable law under the disputes i.e., 
the doctrinal configuration of international law is working against the interest of 
the third world. Developing countries contend that there exists institutional and 
doctrinal bias in international commercial arbitration.149 
Babu states that the often cited “technocratic advantages of arbitration” such 
as speed, less cost, informal and cordial nature of dispute settlement mechanism, 
confidentiality, expert involvement etc are only pretext to promote the western 
business interests.150 Gaps relating to qualified personnel in developing 
countries have also compelled the parties to hire western lawyers by putting up 
heavy costs. According to Gary Born, international arbitration can involve 
significant expense and delay, and it is unwise to make sweeping generalizations 
that international arbitration is quicker or cheaper.151 Moreover, the claim that 
international arbitration is settled by arbitrators who are sufficiently familiar 
with technical and commercial background is not also true, and the majority of 
arbitrators are chosen from lawyers, law professors and judges.152 Most of the 
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experts are summoned as expert witness, just as they would be in national court 
proceedings.153  
There are also criticisms against the peculiar institutional set up of 
international commercial arbitration. In light of these criticisms, one may argue 
that if the advantage of international commercial arbitration is uncertain, it will 
be meaningless for Ethiopia to ratify the Convention. However, in the 
contemporary world, Ethiopia‟s interest to promote international trade and 
investment cannot set aside international commercial arbitration because, as 
Briner noted, international commercial arbitration is the servant of international 
business and trade.154  
5. Prospects of Ratification and the Way Forward  
This author argues that ratification is on balance beneficial to Ethiopia. There 
are problems (discussed above) that are caused by the failure to ratify the 
Convention; and some of the problems that are regarded as adverse effects of 
ratification are either unwarranted or outweighed by the greater interest in 
encouraging trade and investment. The presence of the Addis Ababa Chamber 
of Commerce & Sectoral Associations Arbitration Institute (AACCSA Al), the 
comparative benefit of Addis Ababa as the seat of AU and many international 
organizations, and the pursuits towards encouraging the private sector could be 
factors that enhance the benefits of ratification.  
5.1. Aspects of Ratification and Domestication of the Convention  
The current local laws and practices as discussed above are not conducive to 
commercial arbitration, and will be setbacks to the implementation of the 
Convention. Harmonizing local laws and practices with international principles 
is thus necessary to give outstanding effect to the Convention. Various 
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Civil Code that are incongruent 
with the Convention should be substituted by specific provisions in a legislation 
that deals with arbitration.  
5.1.1 Reservations upon accession 
The first major question that relates to ratification of the NYC is how Ethiopia 
should accede to the Convention. There are two types of reservations.   The First 
Reservation involves reciprocity regarding the scope of the Convention‟s 
application. The NYC provides that: 
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When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying 
extension under Article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity 
declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement 
of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State.155 
This reservation has the effect of tightening the scope of application of the 
Convention only to states which recognize the member state‟s arbitration award 
by virtue of being a Contracting State to NYC. However, as the number of state 
parties to the Convention is growing year by year, the reciprocity reservation is 
becoming a relic.156 The Model law, for example, recognizes awards irrespective 
of their place of rendition, and with its adoption by many states the reciprocity 
reservation is becoming less significant.157 In fact, the major trading partners of 
the country with whom Ethiopian traders may agree to resolve their disputes 
through arbitration are members of the Convention which will likely render the 
reciprocity reservation superfluous.158 Moreover, ratifying the Convention 
without reciprocity reservation will build international image.159  
The Second Reservation relates to the definition of commercial arbitration. 
This reservation entitles a state to apply the Convention to disputes arising “… 
out of legal relationship whether contractual or not, which are considered as 
commercial under the national law of the state making this declaration.”160 This 
reservation has the effect of delimiting the application of the Convention; and it 
creates difficulties in the interpretation of the Convention because what is 
regarded commercial in one state may not be considered as such in another.161 
Commercial reservation was believed to be necessary for some Civil Law 
countries which distinguish between commercial and non-commercial 
transactions.162 More than one-third of the Contracting States use the 
commercial reservation.163 
The commercial reservation generally has not caused problems as the courts 
tend to interpret the coverage of “commercial” broadly, relying on the definition 
                                           
155
 Article 1 (3) of the NYC. 
156
 “The purpose of reciprocity is to revenge countries which do not recognize and enforce 
Ethiopian awards. But this is not as such important and many African Countries (more 
than 16 countries) do not follow reciprocity reservation.” Interview with key informant. 
See also Redfern and Hunter, On International Arbitration, supra note 24, p. 635. 
157
 Article 35 and 36 of the Model Law. 
158
 Interview with  key informant (April 28, 2016); author‟s translation.  
159
  “... ratifying the NYC may not be sufficient to convey a signal to foreign parties, but 
ratifying it without a reservation almost always does.” Berkowitz et al, supra note 61. 
160
 See Article 1 (3) of the Convention. 
161
 Redfern and Hunter, On International Arbitration, supra note 24, p. 636. 
162
 Berg, supra note 48, p. 5. 
163
 Ibid.  
 Towards a Better Commercial Arbitration: Should Ethiopia Ratify the NY Convention?         151 
 
 
of the Model Law.164 Nonetheless, each national State should decide for itself, 
under the provisions of the NYC, what relationships it considers to be 
„commercial‟ for the purposes of the commercial reservation.165 Therefore, this 
author argues that Ethiopia should put the commercial reservation. This is 
because Ethiopia is dominantly a Civil Law country, and its legal system shares 
various characteristics with most of the countries that have opted to use the 
commercial reservation upon ratification of the NYC. This would have a 
positive impact on the problems with regard to the interpretation of arbitrability 
and non-arbitrability of subject matters of a dispute.  Ethiopia‟s failure to have  
a commercial reservation can affect the Ethiopia‟s civil jurisdiction in various 
issues such as family issues,  adoption and other non-commercial spheres.166 
5.1.2 Domestication of the NYC upon accession 
The second important issue is the manner of incorporation of the Convention 
into the domestic legislation of Ethiopia, i.e. domestication. The Convention 
may be incorporated into a country‟s national law by direct reference to the 
Convention or the provisions of the Convention may be embodied in a statute.167 
Where the NYC is incorporated into the state‟s domestic law by direct 
reference, all the terms of the Convention will be incorporated into domestic 
law.168 The Convention can only be implemented through domestic 
legislation,169 and it is the implementing legislation which must be considered 
when looking at issues of enforcement.170 
In countries that have enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law, the relevant 
provisions allowing the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
are found in Articles 35 and 36.171 This author argues that Ethiopia should 
incorporate the Convention by setting out the provisions of the Convention on 
its domestic legislation rather than adoption of by reference to the Convention. 
To this end, the legislation should be crafted in a manner that encourages 
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international commercial arbitration by, for example, following some Model 
Laws including the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
Mere reference to the provisions of the Convention by Ethiopia in the 
absence of comprehensive reform measures will not give effect to the very 
purpose of the Convention, i.e. pro-enforcement bias of the NYC to both 
arbitration agreements and awards. It is to be noted that the UNCITRAL Model 
Law contributes to the Convention‟s pro-enforcement bias.172 Furthermore, 
since the Convention is of a procedural nature and because it leaves many issues 
to the power of state legislation and courts, a comprehensive reform measure 
through the instrumentality of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the area of 
arbitration is necessary for Ethiopia. This can make Ethiopia not only a state 
with a reputation of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, but 
also enables it to institutionalize sound arbitration practices. To use the words of 
Pieter Sanders, upon ratification, “states give to the Convention the life it 
deserves.”   
Conclusion  
Despite criticisms, the Convention is on balance, advantageous to ratifying 
states. Ethiopia is not, however, a party to the Convention ratified by around 158 
states. Ratifying the Convention can positively contribute to Ethiopia‟s pursuits 
toward enhancing trade and investment. Ratification could increase FDI, 
enhance trade, improve arbitration system, build an international image, increase 
competition for trade and investment, decrease court loads, enhance access to 
lower interest rates and facilitate accession to WTO. To this end, Ethiopia 
should incorporate the Convention‟s provisions in an independent legislation 
and domesticate it through the instrumentality of the Model Law.                    ■ 
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